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People have a “gestalt” notion of an ideal distribution of outcomes in time (Camerer and 
Loewenstein, 2004). 
 
 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
The time dimension of utility and decision-making is a challenging topic for social scientists. 
After decades of tests and discussions of the discounted utility model, with the hindsight of 
field data and experiments, the assumption of separability between different sequences of 
utility has been breached; beyond hyperbolic discounting, many anomalies regarding the 
relation between time, decision and utility are now well established. In particular, 
“behavioural economics” (e.g. Camerer and Loewenstein, 2004) acknowledge the possibility 
of inter-temporal spillovers of utility, i.e. the influence of past and future events on current 
utility. Doing so, one is using a notion of utility that is not defined uniquely as a value 
attached ex ante to a decision, by comparison with other choices, but as an experience, i.e. a 
mental state that includes emotions
1.  
How do lags and leads enter into current utility? Past consumption, or past utility is most 
often taken to exert a negative impact over current satisfaction because of benchmarking 
                                                 
1 I refer to Kahneman et al. (1997) for the discussion of the difference between decision-utility and experienced-
utility.   3
effects such as adaptation, satisfaction treadmill
2 (Frederick et al., 2002) and reference point 
effects. Helson (1947) defined adaptation as the diminished responsiveness to a repeated or 
continued stimulus. In a model of rational addiction à la Becker and Murphy (1988) 
adaptation means that current utility is a decreasing function of the stock of accumulated past 
consumption. Such effects can be grouped in the category of “past contrast effects” following 
Loewenstein’s taxonomy (1987). As opposed to the rich literature devoted to adaptation, the 
positive continuing effect of past consumption has been rarely documented, except as 
memory utility (Kahneman, 2003). Studies in child psychology could certainly provide 
illustrations of the benefits of an early accumulation of an initial “stock” of happiness. A 
recent paper by Graham and Oswald (2006) develops the notion of “hedonic capital” as a 
stock on which individuals can draw to smooth bad life-shocks  
Concerning the effect of the future, the literature is now rich with evidence of “anticipatory 
feelings” (Caplin and Leahy, 2001) such as dread, savouring, hope and anxiety. The idea is 
that agents experience by advance the utility of future events (e.g. surgery operation or having 
dinner with a glamorous partner). The intuition dates back to the origin of economic thinking. 
“three distinct ways are recognisable in which pleasurable or painful feelings are caused: (1) 
by the memory of events, (2) by the sensation of present events, (3) by the anticipation of 
future events” ” (Bentham, quoted by Loewenstein, 1987). However, future events can also 
exert a negative contrast effect if one is impatient of enjoying an expected event, which, by 
contrast, makes the present dull. A prisoner about to be released from jail is likely to 
experience this type of negative anticipatory feelings. 
The consequence of inter-temporal spillovers of utility is that the time profile of events 
matters. In particular, adaptation and anticipatory feelings mean that individuals are more 
satisfied at each moment if they see their dynamic consumption trajectory as a rising one. 
Indeed, with aspirations based on past consumption they enjoy consuming more than 
yesterday, and because of savouring they enjoy the perspective of a future improvement. In 
                                                 
2 Adaptation is sometimes declined in two versions: hedonic treadmill and satisfaction treadmill. “Hedonic 
treadmill” refers to the latent pleasure variable, whereas “satisfaction treadmill” invokes the notion of a changing 
aspiration level: i.e. you are more satisfied, but now you aspire to a higher satisfaction level. In other terms, 
satisfaction itself becomes an argument of satisfaction. 
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sum, they enjoy progressing. This paper tries to provide empirical evidence of this 
phenomenon.  
1.1 Why isn’t it trivial? 
Isn’t it trivial that progressing or expecting to progress influences happiness? Although this 
idea is very intuitive (except in the case of negative future contrast effect), it is in 
contradiction with some basic principles of economic thinking.  
First, classically, economists consider that individuals maximize their inter-temporal utility, 
but they assume (for simplicity) that each period’s experienced utility depends only on the 
contemporaneous consumption flow (separability of time sequences).  
Second, when agents make choices that maximize their inter-temporal utility, they are 
supposed to value the flows of current consumption at a higher rate than the same flow of 
consumption available in, say, two years’ time. In other words, they have a preference for the 
present. This is completely at odds with the assumption of savouring and of a preference for 
increasing time profiles of consumption. As pointed by Loewenstein (2003), Caplin and 
Leahy (2001) and Köszegi (2005), anticipated utility gives rise to apparently negative rates of 
discounting of the future. 
Third, consumer theory considers that agents optimise their consumption over their life cycle, 
which leads them to smooth their consumption profile: if they are not financially constrained, 
they borrow and save in order to equalize the marginal utility of consumption at each period, 
i.e. the flows of consumption at each period. This most often does not lead to a rising time-
path of consumption. 
Hence, the welfare influence of pure informational phenomena like expectations are not 
usually acknowledged by standard economic modelling, which does not allow expected future 
improvement to influence immediate welfare directly. 
It is important to stress that the savouring effect that is studied here differs from the obvious 
consumption smoothing whereby agents anticipate, in their current consumption level, the 
higher income due for tomorrow (e.g. Browning and Collado, 2001). The focus of the paper is 
not on the inter-temporal allocation of material consumption, but on the inter-temporal 
externality of satisfaction, i.e. on the “direct effect of information on pleasure and pain” 
(Loewenstein, 2006).   5
1.2 Why does it matter? 
Should economists bother taking into account inter-temporal transfers of utility? There are 
many arguments in favour of doing so. One of them is that inter-temporal utility spillovers 
complicate the understanding of what a rational behaviour should be, and constitutes a 
challenge for the theory of decision-making
3. Consider for example, the notion of satisfaction 
treadmill, which lies at the foundation of the so-called Easterlin paradox. The idea is that 
habituation effects destroy the benefit of growth. This is because of the deleterious role of 
aspirations: “Material aspirations increase commensurately with income, and as a result, one 
gets no nearer to or farther away from the attainment of one’s material goals, and well-being 
is unchanged” (Easterlin, 2003).  
The issue is provocative and important, both for theoreticians and policy-makers. On the 
theoretical side, agents who underestimate the habituation effect that sweeps away part of 
their expected income utility should not be represented as rational utility maximizers, but 
rather as myopic inter-temporally inconsistent persons. They take decisions based on false 
expectations so that their experienced utility turns out to be different (lower) from their 
expected utility
4. On the political side, the market economies of social democracies are based 
on a pro-efficiency-cum-growth consensus. If growth turns out not to be make people happy, 
                                                 
3 Inter-temporal spillovers seem to question the validity of the consumer model by calling in heterodox 
assumptions about agents’ preferences or behaviour. But the recognition of such behaviour can help explaining a 
series of puzzling phenomena. The manipulation of information (strategic learning and remembering) is one of 
those. People who derive utility from their beliefs or representations about the future can rightly choose to “put 
their head in the sand”. Hence, they will not take medical tests in order to avoid thinking about the possibility of 
being ill, or will not prepare their retirement in order to keep away from the idea of old age and death. 
Governments and doctors can also carefully filter the information they give to their patients or citizens in order 
to maximize their welfare (Caplin and Leahy, 2003). More generally, habituation, loss-aversion and anticipatory 
feelings contribute to explain many anomalies and apparently time-inconsistent behaviour, such nominal price 
rigidities, the departure of wages from productivity, or the equity premium puzzle (Camerer and Loewenstein, 
2003, Frederick et al., 2002). 
4 As put by Easterlin (2001): “People […] project current aspirations to be the same throughout the life cycle, 
while income grows. But since aspirations actually grow along with income, experienced happiness is 
systematically different from projected happiness. Consequently, choices turn out to be based on false 
expectations”.    6
then other types of social organizations could be preferable. The implications of the Easterlin 
question thus loom large, questioning the need for paternalism and the choice of capitalism. 
The Easterlin paradox is based on adaptation, i.e. the influence of past consumption on 
current utility. However, taking into account the emotional impact of future prospects can 
bring out different conclusions and reconcile adaptation with growth. Indeed, with a “taste for 
improvement”, working hard for money or any other goal, even in a framework with 
adaptation, turns out not to be a self-defeating project. 
This short discussion illustrates the complexity of the interlocked dynamics of income, 
aspirations, expectations and satisfaction. This paper does not try to estimate a structural 
model of these effects; instead, it tries to estimate a reduced form of the relation between past 
progress or expected progress and satisfaction, taking all the possible precautions to control 
for other concomitant effects.  
1.3 Existing empirical evidence 
So far, the empirical evidence about inter-temporal spillovers has mainly been collected from 
field studies or experiments. (Loewenstein and Sicherman, 1991, Loewenstein and Prelec, 
1991, Loewenstein, Read and Baumeister, 2003, Brocas and Carillo, 2003, 2004, Camerer, 
Loewenstein and Rabin, 2004). A famous and intuitive experiment by Loewenstein and Prelec 
(1991) consisted in asking people to choose over different sequences of dinners at more or 
less fancy restaurants: the results revealed a strong preference for improving sequences 
Recently, a new type of evidence has been provided by experiments in neuroscience and more 
specifically in “neuro-economics” (Camerer et al., 2004). For instance, an experiment by 
Berns et al. (2006) uses functional magnetic resonance imaging to relate brain activity with 
anticipations and dread. They, observe a significant relationship between individual 
differences in the measure of dread in the brain activity and individual differences in inter-
temporal choice behaviour (Loewenstein, 2006). 
By contrast, survey evidence is scarce. Concerning adaptation, di Tella et al. (2005) use the 
German GSOEP panel data and find signs of total habituation to income (but not to status). 
They show that the effect of past income on current satisfaction tends to fade away with time. 
Stutzer (2003), using a Swiss survey, finds that higher income aspirations reduce individual 
utility. He uses the “income evaluation question” (in your circumstances, what income would 
you find sufficient?) as a proxy for aspirations. Aspirations of agents are then found to depend   7
on the average income of their community and on their own income, conformingly to van 
Praag’s earlier finding. One of the most remarkable contributions of the Leyden school is 
indeed the unveiling of a “preference drift”, an evaporation of the ex post effect on 
satisfaction of a rise in individual income, which is due to higher aspirations of agents (see 
van Praag, 1971, 2001 and van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonnell, 2004).  
Concerning spillover effects from the future, Clark et al. (2003) have shown that individuals 
start being less happy one year before they experience job quits, layoffs and unemployment. 
Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell (2004) devote a chapter of their book to “The Impact of 
Past and Future on Satisfaction”. They show that past remembered and future expected 
income both influence current financial satisfaction. Frank and Hutchens (2004) observe the 
increasing wage profiles of commercial airline pilots and intercity bus drivers; they show that 
in both cases, earnings grow more rapidly than productivity over time. They interpret this as a 
sign of a preference for rising consumption profiles, coupled with other behavioural 
assumptions such as lack of willpower and comparison effects which make this type of forced 
saving desirable when individuals are unable to defer present consumption. 
This paper illustrates the fact that acknowledging or expecting an improvement in one’s 
material situation is a motive of life satisfaction. Its main claim is that, ceteris paribus, for a 
given stock of cumulated inter-temporal consumption, people are happier when they 
experience a progression in their standard of living. The principal challenge of this work is to 
show that these results reflect of the impact of progress per se. In particular, I show that the 
results are not due to unobserved individual heterogeneity (personality) or to an omitted 
variable problem. I also check that the LIFE SATISFACTION variable reflects ex post 
experienced utility instead of ex ante decision utility (in which case the results would be 
trivial).  
The next section presents the data and the empirical strategy. Section 3 presents the results, 
section 4 interprets them, section 5 concludes. 
2. DATA AND EMPIRICAL STRATEGY 
This work is based on the waves 5 to 13 of the Russian Longitudinal Monitoring Survey 
(RLMS), a database containing many attitudinal questions related to satisfaction, expectations 
and past changes in individuals’ living standards. These waves correspond to years 1994, 
1995, 1996, 1998, 2000, 2001, 2002, 2003, 2004. This is panel data, so that it is possible to   8
follow the dynamics of expectations and satisfaction during nine consecutive rounds. The 
panel nature of the data also allows to control (at least some of the) unobserved individual 
heterogeneity. Finally, the Russian environment is a guarantee of sufficient variance in the 
dynamics of income, expectations and satisfaction. Essentially, in Russia, aggregate income 
and subjective well-being decline from 1994 and resume after the devaluation of August 1998 
and onwards. Behind these aggregate evolutions, it is well-known that the Russian context 
imposes a high degree of variability and uncertainty upon Russian households (Senik, 2004). 
The main demonstrandum of this paper is the pure effect of progression on welfare: ceteris 
paribus, given their total stock of real expenditure, agents are happier with an increasing time-
profile of consumption. One thus needs to identify the welfare effects of past and expected 
variations in individual consumption. The next sub-section presents the attitudinal questions 
that are used to proxy the inter-temporal consumption flows. 
2.1 Subjective variables as proxies for welfare 
The RLMS data contains several subjective variables that correspond to the perception of 
current, past and future consumption flows, allowing a distinction between notions of contrast 
and level effects. The descriptive statistics of the variables are presented in the Appendix.  
Let Ct, Ct-1, C
a
t, C
a
t+1 be respectively the flows of current consumption of at time t, past 
consumption at time t-1, consumption at time t expected in t-1 and future expected 
consumption at time t+1 expected at time t. The future contrast effect, i.e. the difference 
between current and future expected living standard (C
a
t+1  - Ct), is proxied using the 
EXPECTED IMPROVEMENT subjective variable (Do you think that in the next 12 months you and 
your family will live better than today or worse?). The past contrast effect, Ct-Ct-1, is 
measured using the PAST IMPROVEMENT  question (Tell me, please: How has the financial 
situation of your family changed in the last 12 months?).  
The current consumption of the household Ct is proxied using the LOG REAL EXPENDITURE of 
the year, which is based on a detailed and exhaustive reporting of all consumption items by 
the household. Concerning the past level of consumption Ct-1, one would like to have a 
variable representing “remembered utility” (in the terminology of Kahneman et al., 1997) i.e. 
a question that would ask “what was your living standard last year?”. However, as there is no 
such variable in the dataset, I use LAGGED REAL EXPENDITURE as a proxy for Ct-1.    9
In some specifications, I include the unexpected change in one’s financial situation (Ct - C
a
t); 
to this end, I build the SURPRISE variable as the difference between the variable SITUATION 
HAS IMPROVED and the lagged EXPECTED IMPROVEMENT. In some robustness checks, I also 
use the ECONOMIC SATISFACTION variable (Tell me, please: How satisfied are you with your 
economic conditions at the present time?).  
Eventually, the objective is to assess the effects of these variables on general LIFE 
SATISFACTION, (To what extent are you satisfied with your life in general at the present 
time?). I also use self-assessed HEALTH  (Tell me, please: How would you evaluate your 
health?) as a proxy for experienced utility.  
2.2 Empirical strategy 
The objective is to isolate the pure welfare effect of expectations and change per se, i.e. the 
relation between LIFE  SATISFACTION and indicators of progress such as EXPECTED 
IMPROVEMENT or SITUATION HAS IMPROVED ceteris paribus. To this end, one must overcome 
the difficulty that stems from the intertwined effects of aspirations, adaptation and 
expectations. Suppose for instance that my current positive expectations make me happier 
today but create higher aspirations that render me more difficult to satisfy tomorrow. Then, 
what is the dynamic effect of positive expectations on inter-temporal happiness?  
In order to elucidate this question, an intuitive way is to take a retrospective view. The idea is 
to capture the net result of these complex dynamics of expectations, progress and satisfaction 
by asking the following question: “after several years, for a given stock of inter-temporal 
consumption, do people who have more often experienced or expected a progression in their 
living standard have a higher score of cumulated happiness?” Hence, one needs to estimate a 
relationship between an aggregate indicator of progression and an aggregate score of Life 
Satisfaction, controlling for the total stock of real consumption of the individual over the 
considered period. 
A technical question is what period to consider, i.e. how to aggregate the time series. It is 
tempting to “collapse” the whole period 1994-2004 in order to have more hindsight. 
However, this would not allow controlling for individual unobserved heterogeneity.  
An obvious problem is indeed that happiness and expectations are probably endogenous to 
some idiosyncratic invariant personal feature such as “personality”. Subjective variables are 
particularly subject to anchoring effects that make interpersonal comparisons difficult. For   10
example, more extraverted persons may be systematically more satisfied and more optimistic 
than others, hence the “spurious” relation between the two variables. Supposing that 
personality is time invariant, and that it can be approximated by an additive effect, the usual 
method is to use introduce fixed effects
5.  
In order to keep the time dimension of the data so as to introduce individual fixed effects, I 
thus divide the observations into three blocks of three years
6. I then aggregate the stock of 
consumption and the score of Life Satisfaction inside each block. The equation to estimate is 
(1):  
CUMULATED LIFE SATISFACTION ib = a0 + a1. CUMULATED CONSUMPTIONib + a2. INDICATOR OF 
PROGRESS ib  + a3 .X it + a4. It  +  uit  +  ei      (1) 
where b=1 for years 1994-1996, b=2 for years 1997-2000 and b=3 for years 2001-2004,   
CUMULATED LIFE SATISFACTIONib is the sum of life satisfaction scores of individual i over the 
years of block b,  CUMULATED CONSUMPTIONib is the sum of consumption flows of individual i 
over block b, ei is a time invariant individual fixed effects, Xit is a vector of socio-
demographic controls, It are time dummies, uit is a white noise; these three sets of variables 
are measured at the last year of each time block.  
To be consistent, I retain the last year of each block for the variables that are not “collapsed” 
such as Xit : hence, t =1996 if b=1, t = 2001 if b = 2 and t = 2004 if b = 3. 
The estimation of equation (1) is thus run on a sample of 2808 individuals * 3 years, i.e. 8424 
observations.  
                                                 
5 Subjective variables are ordinal variables, hence, in principle, they are improper to simple differences. Two 
solutions are then available: (i) either collapse the satisfaction and expectations variables into categories 
(satisfied/not satisfied, situation will improve/deteriorate) and run a conditional fixed effect logit model, which 
imposes an important loss of information; (ii) or ignore the ordinal nature of the variables and use classic panel 
models. Surprisingly, after a series of papers which cautiously respected the ordinal nature of subjective 
variables, economists started to go back to linear models, considering after Ferrer-i-Carbonnel and Frijters 
(2004) that introducing fixed effects was of primary importance. In this paper, I adopt essentially adopt the 
second approach, but I check that it is robust to the first one. 
6 I have done the same exercise collapsing the time dimension into two periods of five years: the results are 
identical.   11
In terms of INDICATOR OF PROGRESS, I consider alternatively four indicators. They measure 
respectively the number of times, inside each time block, a individual declares expecting an 
improvement, expecting a stable situation or expecting a deterioration in the material situation 
of his family. I also measure an objective indicator of progression, i.e. the number of times the 
real household income of an individual has increased during the period. All these indicators 
can take discrete values from 0 to 3. 
This specification does not solve all the problems. Another important caveat is that happiness 
and financial expectations can be endogenous to some unobserved variable (omitted variable 
problem). A solution is then to instrument expectations. In addition, there is the suspicion that 
happiness influences expectations rather than the opposite (reverse causation problem). 
People who are unhappy at a certain point of their life could well have a bias towards 
pessimistic expectations of income for instance. On the contrary, people who are satisfied and 
in a good mood could well be more optimistic. Instrumentation also solves part of this 
problem. On the other hand, as long as the causality does go from expectations to happiness, 
one should not mind the existence of a reverse causality too. The objective is not to exclude 
that happiness causes optimistic expectations, but to only assess whether the reverse is true.  
As it is difficult to instrument the aggregate score of expected progress, I use a different 
specification. I regress current Life Satisfaction over instrumented current expectations, 
controlling for socio-demographic variables, time dummies and individual fixed effects. 
Lastly, to be sure to be dealing with experienced utility, I use self-assessed HEALTH (Tell me, 
please: How would you evaluate your health?)  the endogenous variable of the above 
regressions, instead of LIFE SATISFACTION. The next section presents the results of the 
empirical analysis.  
3. RESULTS 
The empirical analysis shows that the time profile of consumption seems to have a welfare 
impact per se. Instrumenting expectations and testing the notion of life satisfaction do not 
alter this result.  
3.1 The importance of progressing 
I start with the estimation of equation (1), which tries to answer the following questions: with 
hindsight, for a given stock of total cumulated consumption over three consecutive periods,   12
how does the fact of having nourished positive expectations feed into cumulated happiness? 
And how does the fact of having experienced a rising income profile affect cumulated 
happiness? This exercise thus tries to capture the welfare effect of the perceived and objective 
time profile of individuals’ living standard. 
Table 1 displays the estimation of equation (1), i.e. regressions of CUMULATED  LIFE 
SATISFACTION scores of the periods 1994-1996, 1998-2001 and 2002-2004 over CUMULATED 
EXPENDITURE in the same periods, an INDICATOR OF CUMULATED PROGRESSION in one’s living 
standard and other controls measured at the last year of each block (1996, 2001, 2004). 
Not surprisingly, total CUMULATED  REAL HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURE exerts an important 
impact on CUMULATED LIFE SATISFACTION. Then, controlling for this variable, column 1 
shows the positive welfare impact of the number of periods individuals objectively 
experienced an increase in their real household income (symmetrically, aggregate happiness 
decreases with the number of periods of declining living standard).  
Turning to subjective variables, Table 1 suggests that the more often individuals have 
nourished positive expectations, the higher their total cumulated happiness score (column 2). 
One additional period of positive expectations increases cumulated happiness by 0.546, 
knowing that the cumulated happiness score over three years varies from 0 to 15 with an 
average of 6.9 and a standard deviation of 0.76. Expecting a stable living standard (column 3) 
is also a factor of cumulated happiness but by a much lower extent. Conversely, the more 
often individuals have expected a deterioration in their living standard, the lower their 
cumulated happiness score (column 4). However, expecting an improvement exerts an impact 
of a larger magnitude than expecting stability or a deterioration.  
Hence, controlling for the total stock of real consumption over three years, there seems to be a 
positive relation between income mobility, both past (objective) and expected, and individual 
total happiness. In other words, for a given amount of consumption over time, the time-profile 
matters: individuals have a preference for increasing time-profiles of consumption.   13
Table 1. Happiness and Consumption Dynamics 
Fixed Effects OLS of Life Satisfaction 
  -1 -2 -3 -4 
      
NB PERIODS WITH HOUSEHOLD INCOME RISE  0,089***     
  [0.034]     
NB PERIODS WITH EXPECTATIONS OF IMPROVEMENT   0.546***     
   [0.041]     
NB PERIODS WITH EXPECTATIONS OF STABILITY     0.106***   
     [0.028]   
NB PERIODS WITH EXPECTATIONS OF DETERIORATION     -0.385*** 
     [0.033] 
LOG TOTAL EXPENDITURE  0,168*** 0.152*** 0.168*** 0.151*** 
  [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] [0.019] 
 
Constant  5.658***  5,653 5,484 6,003 
  [4.024] [3.966] [4.026] [3.980] 
Observations  8284 8214 8214 8214 
Number of persons   2808  2808  2808  2808 
R-squared  0,229 0,254 0,232 0,249 
Log  likelihood  -14844 -14532 -14653 -14561 
      
Controls: age, age square, number of children, working status, marital status, time dummies.  
Regression of cumulated LIFE SATISFACTION SCORES of the periods 1994-1996, 1998-2001 and 2002-2004 over 
cumulated expenditure and cumulated indicators of improvement in the same periods and other controls taken at 
the last year of each block (1996, 2001, 2004). 
 
Before addressing the problem of omitted variables in a systematic way (in section 3.3), I try 
to rule out a possible (sceptical) interpretation of columns 2 to 4 of Table 1, namely that 
people tend to extrapolate the trends that they have experienced in the past. This would imply 
that people who have experienced a past improvement tend to have positive expectations and 
be happier, whereas those who have experience negative outcomes in the past tend to expect 
that the same evolution will happen in the future. If this is so, then Table 1 is not illustrating 
the effect of expected change on happiness but simply the effect of past experience.  
In order to explore this issue, Table 2 presents the regression of current LIFE SATISFACTION 
over current EXPECTED IMPROVEMENT, controlling for real expenditure and the usual controls, 
over three different samples of individuals: the whole sample (column 1), the sub-sample of 
individuals who estimate that their situation has improved as compared to 12 months ago 
(column 2), and the sub-sample of people who think that their situation has worsened or 
remained unchanged (column 3). Table 2 shows that the effect of EXPECTED IMPROVEMENT   14
remains positive and significant whatever the past evolution of the agent. Hence, the effect of 
EXPECTED IMPROVEMENT on LIFE SATISFACTION does not just reflect the past experience of 
individuals. 
Table 2. The impact of expectations does not depend on past evolution 
Fixed Effects OLS Regressions OF LIFE SATISFACTION 
  -1 -2 -3 
  All  Sit. Improved  Sit. did not improve 
 
EXPECTED IMPROVEMENT  0.343*** 0.162**  0.200*** 
  [0.021] [0.080] [0.047] 
 
LOG REAL EXPENDITURE 0.128***  0,019  0.084*** 
  [0.012] [0.060] [0.027] 
Constant 1.482*  9,745  -8.218* 
  [0.781] [7.617] [4.889] 
Observations 17018  1771  5489 
Number of persons  2551  1084  2114 
R-squared  0,128 0,071 0,037 
Log likelihood  -19917  -1228  -5261 
Controls: age, age square, nb kids under 7 in household, nb kids from 7 to 18 years old in household, working 
status, marital status, year dummies. 
Dichotomized variable: expect improvement: yes or no. 
The number of observations is smaller in columns 2 and 3 because variable past improvement is only available 
during four waves, from 2001 to 2004. 
 
3.2 Health and expected improvement 
Another, more worrying, sceptical question is the following: Does the variable LIFE 
SATISFACTION really measures ex post experienced utility and not ex ante expected utility? In 
the latter case, there would be nothing surprising about the fact that expected improvement 
raises expected future utility. By contrast, if declared LIFE SATISFACTION reflects (at least 
partly) experienced happiness, then the observation that this variable is influenced by 
expectations is not trivial. In other words, the question is whether declared LIFE SATISFACTION 
measures a feeling rather than a value judgement.  
How can one depart decision-utility from experienced-utility? One route is to think about the 
definition of health by the World Health Organization (1946): “Health is a state of complete 
physical, mental and social well-being and not merely the absence of disease or infirmity”; 
this description is almost indistinguishable form the definition of well-being, i.e. experienced 
utility. De facto, self-assessed health is highly correlated with declared satisfaction (R2=0.19). 
Now most specialists would agree that health is certainly an experience rather than a   15
judgement. It is thus interesting to use the SELF-ASSESSED HEALTH variable, which is available 
in the RLMS survey, as a proxy for the feeling of satisfaction and see whether it depends on 
past and expected progress.  
I thus estimate an equation similar to (1) in which I replace LIFE SATISFACTION with SELF-
ASSESSED HEALTH.  
Table 3. Health and consumption dynamics 
Fixed effects OLS regressions of SELF-DECLARED HEALTH 
  -1  -2 -3 -4 
       
NB PERIODS WITH HOUSEHOLD INCOME RISE  0,016     
  [0.019]     
NB PERIODS WITH EXPECTATIONS OF IMPROVEMENT   0.095***     
   [0.024]     
NB PERIODS WITH EXPECTATIONS OF STABILITY     0,024   
     [0.016]   
NB PERIODS WITH EXPECTATIONS OF DETERIORATION      -0.101*** 
      [0.019] 
LOG TOTAL EXPENDITURE  0,005  0,002 0,005 0 
  [0.011]  [0.011] [0.011] [0.011] 
Constant  10.141***  10.101*** 10.057*** 10.181*** 
  [2.313]  [2.323] [2.326] [2.320] 
Observations  8214  8214 8214 8214 
Number of persons   2808  2808  2808  2808 
R-squared  within  0,044  0,047 0,044 0,049 
log  likelihood  -10148  -10137 -10147 -10128 
Controls: age, age square, number of children, working status, marital status, time dummies.  
Regression of cumulated Heath scores of the periods 1994-1996, 1998-2001 and 2002-2004 over cumulated 
expenditure and cumulated indicators of improvement in the same periods and other controls taken at the last 
year of each block (1996, 2001, 2004). 
 
As shown by Table 3, self-assessed HEALTH
7 is sensitive to one’s expected consumption 
trajectory. Positive and negative expectations have an impact of similar magnitude (columns 2 
and 4 in Table 3) although negative prospects have a slightly more important impact. This 
contrasts with the regression of LIFE  SATISFACTION, where the number of periods with 
                                                 
7 It may come as a surprise that the coefficients on total expenditure and objective income rise are not 
significant, but this is a classical result that income is not a significant variable in the regression of subjective 
health.   16
EXPECTATIONA OF IMPROVEMENT had a larger impact than the number of periods with 
EXPECTATIONS OF DETERIORATION.  
Hence, SELF-ASSESSED HEALTH can be considered as a proxy of LIFE SATISFACTION but seems 
to have its own profile. In particular, the stress generated by negative anticipatory feelings 
seems to be particularly harmful for subjective health. Beyond these particular feature of self-
assessed health, the lesson of Tables 1 and 3 is that expected and observed progression can be 
considered to influence experienced-utility and not only decision-utility.  
3.3 Ruling out the “omitted variable” interpretation 
When assessing the welfare effect of expected and perceived improvement, how can one be 
sure not to be evaluating the impact of a hidden variable? In this section I concentrate on the 
influence of expectations.  
The classical response to the omitted variable problem is instrumentation, hence one needs to 
think of a variable that influences EXPECTATIONS directly, but only influences LIFE 
SATISFACTION through EXPECTATIONS. Stutzer (2003) uses aggregate income variables and 
contact with neighbours as instruments for aspirations. In a similar spirit, I use the typical 
income of one’s professional group to instrument EXPECTATIONS. I thus regress real income 
(yt) on age, gender, industry, diploma, occupation and regional price level. I then use the 
PREDICTED INCOME of the next period (ŷt+1) as an instrument, which is what agents should 
expect if they had perfect foresight. (I check that indeed agents have quite reasonable 
forecasts about the evolution of their living standard, see section 4.1). Lastly, I verify that 
instrumented expectations do influence self-declared happiness. 
The system of equation to estimate is thus the following: 
•  PREDICTED INCOME:   yt = b0 + b1.[age, gender, education, occupation, region, 
 industry)t + εit  (2.1) 
•  EXPECTED IMPROVEMENT :  Eit = e0 + e1. ŷi t+1 +  vit  +  ωi        (2.2) 
•  LIFE SATISFACTION:  LSit = d0 + d1.Cit + d2. Êit + d3 .Xit + d4. It  +  υit  +  νi     (2.3) 
where ε it, vit and υit are white noises, and ωi  and νi are individual fixed effects.    17
Beyond the usual assumptions about the error terms, this system is based on the assumption 
that PREDICTED FUTURE INCOME ŷi t+1 does not influence LIFE SATISFACTION directly but only 
via  EXPECTATIONS, which means that the right-hand side variables that are used to 
estimate ŷit+1  should also not influence LIFE SATISFACTION directly but only via 
EXPECTATIONS, except those who are also present in the final regression of LIFE 
SATISFACTION, i.e. age and gender. One also has to avoid the risk of perfect multi-collinearity 
between the right-hand side variables in the estimation of  ŷi t+1 and the right-hand side 
variables of the regression of Life Satisfaction, in particular, the socio-demographic variables 
that are designated under the term Xit. As shown in Table 4, Xit includes age, age square, the 
number of children under 7 years old and between 7 and 18 years old, the working status and 
the marital status of the individuals. This exclusion relation should ensure that this risk is 
avoided. 
Table 4. Two Stage Least Square Regression of LIFE SATISFACTION  
EXPECTATIONS Instrumented by PREDICTED INCOME for the Next Period 
 
     
Second stage regression of LIFE SATISFACTION 
  Coef. Std.  Err.  t 
EXPECTED IMPROVEMENT  0,81 0,20 4,04 
Log real expenditure  0,09  0,04  2,25 
Age -0,01  0,01  -1,5 
Age  square  0,00 0,00 2,76 
Nb child<7  -0,05  0,02  -2,93 
Nb child 7<n<18  -0,04  0,01  -2,85 
Working  0,18 0,03 5,58 
Never married  -0,03  0,04  -0,85 
Divorced -0,10  0,04  -2,56 
Widow -0,12  0,04  -3,34 
_cons -0,57  0,47  -1,23 
     
Number of obs  18290     
Nb clusters  2801     
F( 10,  2800)  96,98     
Prob > F  0,00     
R-squared 0,04     
Root MSE  1,05     
     
First-stage regression of EXPECTED IMPROVEMENT   
  Coef. Std.  Err.  t 
PREDICTED FUTURE INCOME  0,12 0,02 6,25 
Log real expenditure  0,20  0,01  24,15 
Age -0,04  0,00  -14,7 
Age  square  0,00 0,00 11,64 
Nb  child<7  0,02 0,01 1,65 
Nb child 7<n<18  -0,05  0,01  -5,33   18
Working -0,12  0,02  -7,02 
Never  married  0,00 0,03 0,05 
Divorced  0,00 0,03 -0,09 
Widow  0,03 0,02 1,34 
_cons  1,22 0,18 6,79 
     
Number of obs  18290     
nb clusters  2801     
F( 10, 18279)  156,76     
Prob > F  0,00     
R-squared 0,08     
Adj R-squared  0,08     
Root MSE  0,94     
Regression with robust errors, cluster (individual). Dichotomic happiness variable. 
Instrumented:  Expected improvement. 
 
The results of Table 4 show that the predicted income of the next period does influence 
current expectations and that instrumented expectations, in turn, do influence Life 
Satisfaction. Hence, one cannot reject the assumption that the relation between EXPECTED 
IMPROVEMENT and LIFE SATISFACTION is not spurious. 
The same doubt can be cast on SUBJECTIVE HEALTH: do optimistic persons feel more healthy 
or is there some unobserved reason why they feel both more optimistic and more healthy? 
Likewise for the regression of LIFE  SATISFACTION, I try to establish the direction of the 
causality by instrumenting EXPECTED IMPROVEMENT on future PREDICTED INCOME, assuming 
that PREDICTED INCOME only influences SUBJECTIVE HEALTH via EXPECTATIONS. The result of 
the 2SLS estimation confirms that there is some causality going from expectations to health: 
in the first stage estimation of EXPECTED IMPROVEMENT, the coefficient of PREDICTED INCOME 
is 0,032, with a T statistics of 4; in the second stage estimation of HEALTH, the coefficient of 
instrumented EXPECTED IMPROVEMENT is 0,949, with a T statistics of 2,4 (controlling for the 
usual variables).  
Hence experienced utility, as proxied by SELF-DECLARED HEALTH, seems to be influenced by 
expectations. 
3.4 The elements of moment utility 
Having found that consumption profiles seem to exert an impact on Life Satisfaction, a 
natural question is the relative importance of past and future evolutions on the one hand, and   19
of contrast versus level effects on the other hand. The idea is thus to evaluate the various 
elements of the total moment utility (Kahneman et al., 1997) by estimating equation (3):  
LIFE SATISFACTIONit = α0 + α1. CURRENT CONSUMPTION it + α2. LAGGED CONSUMPTION it + 
α3. PAST IMPROVEMENT + α4. EXPECTED IMPROVEMENT it + α5. SURPRISE it + α6 .X it + α7.It  +  ϕi 
+  ηit       (3) 
where X it is a vector of socio-demographic controls, ϕi represents time invariant individual 
fixed effects, It are time dummies and ηit is a white noise. Current and lagged consumption 
effects are captured using the actual LOG REAL EXPENDITURE of the household. 
It is important to control for current consumption in order to separate the effect of progress 
from that of consumption itself. Not controlling for current consumption, a positive 
coefficient on PAST IMPROVEMENT could be interpreted as reflecting the effect of the level of 
consumption reached by the individual. Similarly, a positive coefficient on EXPECTED 
IMPROVEMENT could be interpreted as the effect of consumption smoothing; in this case, their 
increased happiness cannot be attributed to the perspective of future consumption, but to the 
higher current consumption that they enjoy. 
Table 5.A displays fixed effects OLS regressions of LIFE SATISFACTION. It confirms the 
importance of EXPECTED IMPROVEMENT and PAST IMPROVEMENT. The other socio-
demographic controls are not displayed; they exhibit the usual properties, namely that life 
satisfaction is best for married people as opposed to single, divorced or widowed, that its 
relation with age is U shaped, and that working is positive (see for instance Frey and Stutzer, 
2002, or Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004).    20
Table 5.A. Fixed Effects OLS Regressions of LIFE SATISFACTION 
 L IFE SATISFACTION 
  
EXPECTED IMPROVEMENT 0,166*** 
 [0,023] 
PAST IMPROVEMENT 0,235*** 
 [0,031] 
SURPRISE 0,017 
 [0,019] 
LOG REAL HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURE 0,083*** 
 [0,026] 
LAGGED LOG REAL HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURE 0,031 
 [0,025] 
Constant -6,26 
 [4,397] 
Observations 5986 
Number of persons  1995 
R-squared 0,102 
log likelihood  -5953,37 
Controls: age, age square, nb kids under 7 in household, nb kids from 7 to 18 
years old in household, working status, marital status, year dummies.  
Regression on years 2001-2004 for which the variable PAST IMPROVEMENT  is 
non-missing. 
 
Table 5.A suggests that although past evolution exert a clear impact on LIFE SATISFACTION, it 
does not matter whether it is expected or unexpected. Indeed, the coefficient on the variable 
SURPRISE is not significant. (The variable SURPRISE captures the part of the change that was 
not expected at the previous period. It is defined as the difference between observed change in 
period t minus expected change in period t-1). This could be hiding the existence of an 
asymmetric effect of positive versus negative surprises. To investigate this possibility, Table 
5.B presents a specification of the regression of LIFE SATISFACTION where all variables are 
dichotomised. 
The asymmetric impact of bad versus good surprises 
I thus split all subjective variables, including LIFE SATISFACTION into categorical dummies 
and estimate a conditional fixed effects logit model. The variable SURPRISE has been recoded 
into three modalities: positive, negative or zero. 
   21
Table 5.B. Conditional Fixed Effects Logit Regressions of LIFE SATISFACTION 
  -1 -2 -3 
     
SITUATION WILL IMPROVE  0,557*** 0,575*** 0,506*** 
  [0,119] [0,125] [0,129] 
SITUATION WILL WORSEN -0,309*  -0,258  -0,305 
  [0,178] [0,191] [0,197] 
SITUATION HAS IMPROVED 0,692***    0,650*** 
 [0,110]    [0,145] 
SITUATION HAS WORSENED -0,450***    -0,18 
 [0,143]    [0,170] 
GOOD SURPRISE   0,268**  -0,061 
   [0,114]  [0,136] 
BAD SURPRISE   -0,552***  -0,326** 
   [0,121]  [0,139] 
LOG REAL EXPENDITURE  0,230*** 0,304*** 0,275*** 
  [0,085] [0,094] [0,095] 
LAGGED LOG REAL EXPENDITURE  0,126 0,126 0,112 
  [0,083] [0,090] [0,091] 
Constant     
     
Observations  2988 2563 2563 
Number of persons  848  729  729 
log likelihood  -990,33  -856,5  -845,35 
 Controls: age, age square, nb kids under 7 in household, nb kids from 7 to 18 years old in 
household, working status, marital status, year dummies.  
For categorical variables, the omitted categories are respectively: “situation will remain stable”, 
“situation has not change” and “no surprise”( i.e. observed change=expected change).  
Regression on years 2001-2004 for which the variable PAST IMPROVEMENT is non-missing. 
 
The coefficients of the first four rows of Table 5.B are not surprising. Column 2 shows that 
BAD SURPRISES have a greater impact than GOOD SURPRISES. 
In Table 5.B, I introduce successively SITUATION HAS IMPROVED/WORSENED (column 1), 
SURPRISE (GOOD and BAD) (column 2), and finally all effects together (column 3). Comparing 
column 1 with column 2, one can see that the coefficient on GOOD SURPRISE is smaller than the 
coefficient on SITUATION HAS IMPROVED, whereas the coefficient on BAD SURPRISE is higher 
than the coefficient on SITUATION HAS WORSENED: when things worsen, this has a greater 
negative impact on well-being if this was not expected.  
Putting the two sets of variables together, one sees (in column 3) that observed improvement 
“kills” the effect of a surprise improvement, whereas the reverse is true for deterioration. The 
coefficient on GOOD SURPRISE is not significant, whereas that on BAD SURPRISE is. In other   22
words, improvement is good per se, whether expected or not, whereas worsening is 
particularly harmful when it is unexpected. Mellers and MacGraw’s (1999) have suggested 
that surprise has a greater effect on satisfaction than expected events: this seems to be 
particularly true of negative evolutions. 
4. INTERPRETATION 
This set of results suggest the following conclusions: Remembered and expected events exert 
an important impact on current experienced utility. They influence Life Satisfaction as well as 
self-assessed health. Declared Life Satisfaction thus expresses moment-utility, which, 
according to Kahneman (2003), is best suited for constructing a measure of objective 
happiness. 
The finding that deterioration is more painful when it is unexpected can be related to 
Kahneman and Tversky’s prospect theory (1979), which postulates that people evaluate 
outcomes relative to a neutral point, with an asymmetry of comparisons relative to this point.  
Well-known under the name of “loss-aversion”, this asymmetry implies that the pain from a 
loss is greater than the pleasure from a gain (relative to the neutral point). Somehow, a 
negative shock constitutes a loss by reference to the outcome that was expected. 
More generally, ceteris paribus, people are happier when they observe or expect a positive 
change. This suggests the existence of a preference for sequences that improve over time. As 
put by Camerer and Loewenstein (2004): “A majority of subjects prefer sequences that 
improve over time. Preferences for improvement appear to be driven in part by savouring and 
dread, and in part by adaptation and loss-aversion”. This is because “improving sequences 
allow decision makers to savour the best outcomes under the end of the sequence. With losses, 
getting undesirable outcomes over with quickly eliminates dread. Adaptation leads to a 
preference for improving sequences because people tend to adapt to ongoing stimuli over 
time and to evaluate new stimuli relative to their adaptation level […]. Loss aversion 
intensifies the preference for improvement over deterioration ”. 
But is it rational to have a taste for improvement in the presence of adaptation? In order to 
answer this question, in the next section, I focus on the role of expectations.    23
4.1 Happiness out of illusion? 
Is it because agents underestimate adaptation and overestimate their future welfare that 
positive prospects make them happy
8, as suggested by Easterlin (2001)? Partisans of 
economic growth could reply that even so, people who strive for money, although they may 
find out that the increase in their material standard is not as satisfying as expected, may 
nonetheless have enjoyed the perspective.  
However, this raises a series of issues. First, how much value can we attach to growth if its 
welfare effect is due to agents’ misprediction of their future utility? More importantly, when 
agents acknowledge that their expectations were too high, how much disutility does this 
generate? To what extent does the ex post disutility of disappointment compensate the flow of 
anticipatory feelings that was felt ex ante? Conversely, is there a possibility of a double 
dividend: one from the imagination, one from the realization of the event? 
Column 3 in Table 5.B brings an element of answer to this question by showing that the 
impact of a “bad surprise” is of about the same magnitude as that of positive expectations. 
However, bad surprises seem to be less frequent than correct expectations; as suggested by 
Table 1, which shows that the inter-temporal effect of having positive expectations is to 
increase cumulated happiness. An interpretation of Table 1 is thus that in spite of adaptation 
and possible forecasting errors, positive prospects seem to exert a net positive effect on 
individual inter-temporal welfare. 
Moreover, the data shows that agents make quite reasonable predictions about their future 
standard of living. In the fixed effect OLS regression of PAST IMPROVEMENT (How has the 
financial situation of your family changed in the last 12 months?) at period t, the coefficient 
of EXPECTED IMPROVEMENT (Do you think that in the next 12 months you and your family will 
live better than today or  worse?) at period t-1 is positive, important and significant at the 1% 
level. Identically, in the regression of current ECONOMIC SATISFACTION at time t, controlling 
for lagged economic satisfaction at time t-1, the coefficient of lagged EXPECTED 
IMPROVEMENT is positive and significant. Hence, the data do not validate the assumption that 
                                                 
8  The literature is rich of examples of mistaken forecasts of future welfare. Loewenstein (1987, 2003) for 
instance, reports the experience of people whose degree of anxiety about a future surgery operation turns out to 
be much more intense that the actual pain they actually suffer during the operation.    24
agents are not lucid about their future prospects, and more precisely that they fail in predicting 
the way they will appreciate their consumption level in the future (which is what adaptation is 
about). 
But if adaptation is total and agents are aware of it, do they still have a preference for 
increasing profiles? The answer could be affirmative if agents had a pure taste for progression 
per se. However, the data that we are using do not validate the assumption of complete 
adaptation: To test the extent of adaptation to income, I use the same method as Di Tella, de 
New and MacCulloch (2005), namely, I introduce HOUSEHOLD EXPENDITURE at time t, t-1, t-2 
and t-3, in the regression of LIFE SATISFACTION, controlling for the usual socio-demographic 
variables. I do not find evidence of a strong adaptation effect. The coefficients on the lagged 
variables are not significant. Identically, I introduce ECONOMIC SATISFACTION at time t, t-1, t-
2 and t-3 in the regression of Life Satisfaction. Again, the coefficients on the lagged variables 
are not significant. Only consumption at time t-3 is negative. Their order of magnitude is ten 
times as small as than the coefficient of current ECONOMIC SATISFACTION. Hence, the data 
hardly support the assumption of adaptation, and certainly not the assumption of complete 
adaptation. 
In summary, expectations are not completely misled, they are consistent with agents’ ex post 
evaluation of their situation, which in turn influences Life Satisfaction, as we have seen in 
section 3. One can conclude that agents are not completely mistaken when they rejoice at the 
prospect of a future improvement in their living standard. Their anticipatory feelings are not 
totally compensated by an ex post dissatisfaction. 
4.2 A built-in disposition? 
Why do agents have a preference for time-increasing consumption profiles? Camerer and 
Loewenstein (2004) go as far as claiming that “people have a “gestalt” notion of an ideal 
distribution of outcomes in time”, which means that trying to progress is something like a 
built-in mechanism, a basic instinct. This observation finds an echo in the psychologic corpus, 
in particular the so-called tellic theories.  
Firstly, having aspirations as such is recognized as being good for one’s happiness. 
“Dispositional optimism” for instance, i.e. “one’s characteristic thoughts about the future”, is 
considered by many psychologists as a correlate of happiness (Diener et al., 1999). Cantor 
and Sanderson (quoted by Diener et al., 1999, p 284) note that “having goals provides a sense   25
of personal agency and a sense of structure and meaning to daily life”. Emmons (1986) 
reports that “positive affect and a higher life satisfaction are associated with past fulfilment of 
goals and with having valued goals, independent of past success”. Pomerantz et al. (quoted by 
Diener and Lucas, 2000) also claim that “people with more goals that they consider very 
important have higher life satisfaction, self-esteem and positive affect”. As a contraposée, not 
trying to progress, not having aspirations is often considered by psychologists as a sign of 
depression or illness. 
Secondly, the mere fact of moving towards one’s goals is also recognized as a source of well-
being. Michalos (1985) notes that “the process of moving towards one’s aspirations may be 
more important to well-being than the end-state of goal attainment. Thus people with high 
aspirations and low current outcomes may be satisfied as long as they are making adequate 
progress towards their goal”. According to Emmons (1986), “happiness results more from 
the pursuit of a goal than from the attainment of a goal”.  
Some authors attribute these observations to anthropologic considerations. They see the 
attempt to progress as a built-in mechanism specific to humanity. Frank and Hutchens (2004, 
p 555) for instance, note that the biological model of human nervous system creates the 
condition of sensitivity to change and deviation rather than to level. It is also tempting to look 
at the improvement instinct as a feature selected by evolution
9.  
Philosophical minds will prefer to refer to the legend of Sisyphus. As a punishment inflicted 
by Zeus, Sisyphus was doomed to push a boulder uphill over and over again, knowing that as 
soon as the rock would reach the top it would immediately fall back. In a similar way, man 
could be doomed to progress: progressing does not always make him much more happy, but 
not doing so would condemn him to an even more cruel fate. A more optimistic interpretation 
of Sisyphus would be the view of Descartes that self-esteem is the basis of happiness. Hence, 
progressing, while as painstaking as pushing Sisyphus’ boulder, would make man happy by 
generating self-esteem, or the pleasure that derives from contemplating a valuable goal.    
                                                 
9 Of course, it could be argued that evolutionism is based on competition, and that it is competition that forces 
individuals to progress, in spite of their preference for leisure. But then the question has to be addressed why 
people engage into competition.   26
5. CONCLUSION 
This paper has illustrated the existence of anticipatory feelings and the preference for 
improving sequences of consumption. Raising the incomes of all may not increase the 
happiness of all, but expecting a financial improvement seems to be a motive of well-being 
per se, beyond the obvious effect of consumption smoothing. To be sure, this pro-growth 
argument may not be decisive; in particular it does not take into account the negative 
externalities of growth. Similar effects could also probably be evidenced in other domains and 
it would be interesting to compare the relative impact of material improvement versus 
progress in other fields. Concerning economic growth, the lesson of this paper is that, akin to 
Sisyphus doom, progressing is the human lot.   27
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APPENDIX. DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
Source RLMS rounds 5 to 13 (1994-2004), population from 18 to 65 years old. 
LIFE SATISFACTION. To what extent are you satisfied with your life in general at the present time? 
 
LIFE SATISFACTION  1994 1995 1996 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total 
      
Not at all satisfied  576  759  873 1071 661 504 365 410 368 5587 
Less than satisfied  1153  1029  1006 978 1114 1094 895 1016 911 9196 
Both yes and no  525  540  538 482 602 656 707 645 714 5409 
Rather  satisfied  244 203 200 214 324 447 695 616 725 3668 
Fully  satisfied  76 80 48 45 76 86 139 112 74 736 
Total  2574 2611 2665 279 2777 2787 2801 2799 2792 24596 
 
 
PAST IMPROVEMENT.  Tell me, please: How has the financial situation of your family changed in the last 12 
months? 
 
PAST IMPROVEMENT 2001  2002 2003 2004 Total
  
Greatly worsened  239  179 177 194 789
Slightly worsened  427  400 395 413 1635
Has not changed  1495  1521 1592 1633 6241
Slightly improved  564  611 575 475 2225
Greatly improved  62  79 35 54 230
Total 2787  279 2774 2769 1112
 
 
ECONOMIC SATISFACTION.    Tell me, please: How satisfied are you with your economic conditions at the 
present time? 
 
ECONOMIC SATISFACTION 2000  2001  2002 2003 2004 Total
    
Not at all satisfied  1096  904  830 809 855 4494
Less than satisfied  1099  1155  1066 114 1085 5545
Both yes and no  348  420  444 468 463 2143
Rather satisfied  207  285  398 332 360 1582
Fully satisfied  42  37  64 51 37 231
Total 2792  2801  2802 28 28 13995
 
 
EXPECTED IMPROVEMENT. Do you think that in the next 12 months you and your family will live better than 
today or  worse? 
 
EXPECTED IMPROVEMENT  1994 1995 1996 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total 
      
You will live much worse  595  593  573 748 233 143 119 111 138 3253 
You will live somewhat worse  597  533  507 548 355 279 293 300 332 3744 
Nothing will change  894  949  1006 797 1249 1411 1475 1413 1438 10632 
You will live somewhat better  293  249  247 209 397 485 479 458 411 3228 
You will live much better  45  45  33 33 54 53 70 36 68 437 
Total  2424 2369 2366 2335 2288 2371 2436 2318 2387 21294   31
 
 
HEALTH. Tell me, please: How would you evaluate your health? It is: 
 
HEALTH 1994  1995  1996 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 Total 
      
Very  bad  52 37 32 51 73 66 67 68 95 541 
Bad  375 373 391 409 414 448 465 514 491 388 
Average, not good, but not bad  1697  1589  1584 1608 1658 169 1653 1626 1607 14712 
Good 643  762  761 663 602 574 581 564 577 5727 
Very good  35  31  33 66 53 26 36 27 23 330 
Total 2802  2792  2801 2797 28 2804 2802 2799 2793 2519 
 
TOTAL REAL EXPENDITURE OF THE HOUSEHOLD 
Year  1994  1995 1996 1998 2000 2001 2002 2003  2004 
Mean  10356 8757 7722 5749 6830 7752 7622 8620  8342 
Standard  deviation  8930  8800 8316 5914 7879 7734 6834 13291 8528 
 
CUMULATED SUBJECTIVE VARIABLES BY BLOCKS OF YEARS 
        Obs.  Mean  Std, Dev.  Min  Max 
1994-1996          
Number of periods with objective income rise  8424  0,77  0,61  0  2 
Number of periods with expectations of improvement  8424  0,32  0,66  0  3 
Number of periods with expectations of stability  8424  1,01  0,94  0  3 
Number of periods with expectations of stability  8424  1,21  1,05  0  3 
Cumulated Life Satisfaction  score  8424  6,05 2,61  0 15 
          
1998-2001          
Number of periods with objective income rise  8424  1,64  0,70  0  3 
Number of periods with expectations of improvement  8424  0,44  0,74  0  3 
Number of periods with expectations of stability  8424  1,23  0,94  0  3 
Number of periods with expectations of stability  8424  0,82  0,87  0  3 
Cumulated Life Satisfaction  score  8424  6,70 2,37  0 15 
          
2002-2004          
Number of periods with objective income rise  8424  1,79  0,69  0  3 
Number of periods with expectations of improvement  8424  0,54  0,85  0  3 
Number of periods with expectations of stability  8424  1,54  1,02  0  3 
Number of periods with expectations of stability  8424  0,46  0,78  0  3 
Cumulated Life Satisfaction  score  8424  8,10 2,57  0 15   32
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